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Abstract 
In order to be exercised meaningfully, political freedom requires the capacity to actually 
identify available policy options. To ensure this, society ought to engage in deliberation 
as a discussion oriented towards mutual learning. In order to highlight this issue, I define 
deliberation in terms of the participants’ openness to preference change, i.e. the delibera-
tive stance. In the context of the systemic approach to deliberative theory, I find several 
factors causing the atrophy of such a deliberative stance. I note that this state can occur 
not only when debaters are representatives or are in the presence of an audience, but also 
when they face the prospect of a binding decision. It is the latter effect that is a serious 
challenge to the micro-deliberative strategy, one that strives towards decisional powers 
being granted to deliberative minipublics. Presenting my findings, I propose—as an alter-
native to the power-oriented ‘ladder of participation’—a distinction between traditional 
co-decision and deliberative consultation, the latter one being (in certain systemic con-
texts) an environment that is more conducive to deliberative stance. This new typology 
highlights factors that lead to preference petrification and allows for the appreciation of 
the non-decisional character of micro-deliberation. All of it leads to the conclusion that, 
in order to preserve their deliberative character in the systemic context, deliberative min-
ipublics should not always be required to have decision-making powers. 
Keywords: deliberative democracy; deliberative stance; preference change; 
deliberative systems. 
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I don’t attach much importance to victory. 
Nothing is so stupid as to conquer; 
true glory lies in convincing. 
(Victor Hugo, Les Miserables) 
 
1. Introduction 
One of the most relevant definitions of political freedom states that it, “generally speaking, 
means the right ‘to be a participator in government’, or it means nothing” (Arendt, 1990, 
p. 218). Unfortunately—in the age of mediatization (Hajer, 2009), affective polarization 
(Druckman, Peterson, & Slothuus, 2013) and post-truth (Keyes, 2004)—mere participa-
tion can be channeled into manipulative cooptation by a dishonest actor. It can be instru-
mentalized either to reinforce the dysfunctional status quo, or to support devastating, 
exploitative, and tyrannical changes. I would like to take advantage of this opportunity 
connected with the theme of this journal’s issue to expand considerations on political free-
dom onto its background. I wish to explore its preconditions and issues that are way too 
often ignored or taken for granted. That is why I seemingly abandon the notion of political 
freedom. I am, however, keeping it in sight in order to bring it back in the end, when the 
proper foundations are set.  
Thus, in this paper, I focus on prerequisites of the meaningful practicing of political free-
dom as the capacity of an individual or a group to formulate and comprehend a substantial 
spectrum of policy options to choose from. I will focus not merely on the objective possi-
bility of such options, but also on the realization of what these options really are. I argue 
that political freedom of a person cannot be fully realized without the person’s willingness 
and ability to listen to others, thus expanding her or his understanding of the issue. In other 
words, I insist that political freedom requires and demands—at least at some point—an 
engagement in deliberation. I therefore emphasize the role of certain conditions of modern 
political discourse as structural barriers. In my view they limit our scope of public imagi-
nation, narrowing policy options to those dictated by our preexisting preferences, i.e. ide-
ologies, emotions, and self-interests. In other words, I argue that political freedom implies 
a duty to listen.  
Listening became a focal point of Andrew Dobson’s book titled Listening for Democracy: 
Recognition, Representation, Reconciliation (2014). It also turns out to be a core idea 
within the theory of deliberative democracy that emphasizes the role of learned discus-
sion—deliberation—as a way of shaping political will in a democracy (Dryzek, 2002, 
p. 32; Held, 2006, pp. 125–184). The openness to opinion change through such delibera-
tion should be considered as the defining feature of deliberation. On that note, David Owen 
and Graham Smith (2015, p. 228) introduced a concept of ‘deliberative stance’, i.e. “a 
relation to others as equals engaged in the mutual exchange of reasons oriented as if to 
reaching a shared practical judgment”. For the purposes of this paper (focusing on the 
“shared judgement” aspect), I define the deliberative stance as an attitude of being open 
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to position change in response to arguments and reasons provided by others in a discussion 
(i.e. a conversation with a difference of positions). It is an inherent element of deliberative 
“weighing and reflecting” (Mansbridge, 2015, pp. 27–49). Participants’ willingness to 
agree with a better argument or accept someone else’s greater needs is what distinguishes 
deliberation from other forms of public discourse, i.e. debate and bargaining. The reality 
of politics, however, usually leads to those very forms. In debates (1), participants take an 
eristic stance, employing the Arthur Schoppenhauer’s (2005) The Art of Always Being 
Right in order to “win the argument” (e.g. in order to convince the spectators) “without 
regard to truth o reason”, thus being persistent and uncompromising in standing by their 
prior views. On the other hand, egocentric bargaining (2) occurs when participants are 
willing to change their position, but only under the condition of receiving something in 
return. Both of these non-deliberative stances, i.e. an uncompromising mindset and benefit 
seeking, lead to the atrophy of the deliberative stance and the atrophy of deliberation itself. 
The atrophy of deliberation is the absence or decay of a deliberative stance among partici-
pants of a debate. This phenomenon—referred to as positional politics—represents a crucial 
flaw in many parliamentary discourses (Steenbergen, Bächtiger, Spörndli, & Steiner, 
2003). It is also one of the most challenging problems for deliberative democratic theory, 
especially for the ‘micro-deliberative strategy’ that strives for decisional powers to be 
granted to deliberative minipublics (Thompson, 2008), i.e. the methods of the practical im-
plementation of deliberative ideals, such as deliberative opinion polls (Fishkin, Luskin, & 
Jowell, 2000). As David Owen and Graham Smith claim, “We need to better understand 
the challenges of adopting and cultivating the deliberative stance within the ‘unruly politics 
of social life’” (2013, p. 229). They pose the following question: “to what extent and under 
what circumstances do partisanship, expertise, consumption practices and the like sustain 
or undermine the conditions for taking up a deliberative stance?” (Owen & Smith, 2013, 
p. 229). In other words—why and how is deliberative stance undermined? 
The recent systemic turn in deliberative democratic theory provides an appropriate perspec-
tive for this issue (Mansbridge et al., 2012). Rather than being oriented merely towards 
deliberative techniques or methods known as minipublics (a narrow deliberative approach), 
it introduces the concept of a deliberative system as a certain totality of deliberative and 
non-deliberative practices yielding ‘deliberative’ results. It searches for deliberative quali-
ties not in individual debates, but in the entirety of the deliberative system (Elstub & 
McLaverty, 2013). In some instances, it answers the call for an “integrative” or “ecumenical 
approach” by combining benefits of micro and macro deliberative theories (Hendriks, 2006; 
Goodin, 2008; Dryzek, 2010a). The latter one, however, is criticized for insisting on grant-
ing decision-making powers to minipublics. Such a gesture, as Cristina Lafont (2015) ar-
gues, would diminish rather than improve the democratic legitimacy of the deliberative 
system. By introducing the concept of the decisional atrophy of deliberative stance, I also 
wish to approach critically the notion of decision-making micro-deliberation. 
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Firstly, I distinguish deliberation from other types of discourse, namely debate and bar-
gaining. By linking deliberation with social learning, I find out that the most popular ty-
pology of citizen participation, namely Sherry Arnstein’s (1969) ladder of participation, 
might require a serious revision, since it ignores the educational aspect by being entirely 
decision-centered. With this, I identify the phenomenon of the decisional atrophy of de-
liberative stance as well as I propose a distinction between co-decision and consultation, 
generating a typology that is alternative to the power-oriented ladder of participation. This 
new typology highlights factors that lead to preference petrification and allows for the 
appreciation of the non-decisional character of deliberative minipublics within the entirety 
of the deliberative system. 
My proposition draws from this systemic turn in its key point, i.e. through the consideration 
of deliberative democratic theory as complementary rather than antagonistic to other forms 
of democracy (with their non-deliberative mechanisms, such as voting, strikes, protests, 
and even eristic debates), and the searching for ways to improve the deliberative qualities 
of the entire political system. However, I strive to achieve this goal by exploring a notably 
different path. Instead of perceiving deliberation in a systemic and expansive way, I restrict 
it to a single discursive event (discussion) and to a pure type of discourse, one that is distinct 
from bargaining and debate. I do this on an analytical level in order to study the potential 
place for such a deliberation in the deliberative system. Thus, I link the narrow, micro-
deliberative approach—focused on deliberative methods in one place at a given time, as 
represented by authors such as James Fishkin (2011) or Adolf Gundersen (2000)—with the 
systemic one (Mansbridge et al., 2012) that derives from the discursive approach (Dryzek, 
2002; Habermas, 2002). This will allow me to more aptly fulfill the goals of the systemic 
approach, namely the identification of “(a) the occasions and sites of deliberation and (b) 
the discursive scaffolding that supports good deliberation” (Owen & Smith, 2013). 
 
2. Deliberation: Theoretical Remarks 
I define ‘deliberation’ in a narrow sense, i.e. as a discussion (a structured conversation 
with a difference of opinions) with the prospect of preference change among its partici-
pants (unlike in a debate) that is not conditioned by benefits (unlike in bargaining); the 
said preference change may be the result of learning from others about their reasons, self-
interests, emotions, etc. Therefore, the defining feature is the prospect of opinion change, 
i.e. the openness of listeners (though this one is difficult to operationalize) rather than the 
actual opinion change, the latter of which might not occur due to insufficient argumenta-
tion. It is an approach that should be distinguished from a broader, i.e. discursive approach 
(Smith, 2013), which is a precursor to the systemic turn (Owen & Smith, 2013). The dis-
cursive approach identifies deliberation as the entirety of public discourse as it encom-
passes various kinds of communicative events within the public domain, resulting in a 
hypothetical preference change, albeit not so much by the participants but, rather, by the 
audience. Although this seems fundamental in the new systemic approach, for analytical 
reasons I will use the aforementioned narrow definition. 
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Following Simone Chamber’s reservations (2012, p. 59), one has to admit that this ap-
proach stands also in stark contrast to the definition proposed by Joshua Cohen, for whom 
deliberation “is about weighing the reasons relevant to a decision with a view to making a 
decision on the basis of that weighing” (2007, p. 219). I have nonetheless selected it for 
two reasons. Firstly, having in mind Gundersen’s (2000) notion of “dyadic deliberation”, 
I wish to analyze deliberation as a conversation that involves at least two persons with a 
difference of opinions on how a given issue should be resolved, while Cohen’s definition 
seems to include even a kind of “solitary deliberation” (Goodin, 2000). Secondly, the au-
thor concentrates on the decision-making aspect, whereas I intend to focus on the deliber-
ative stance, i.e. an attitude of openness to opinion change that is unique to this type of 
discourse. In fact, I will consider the prospects of a binding decision—made unanimously 
or by a majority—as a factor influencing this specific attitude. Here, it is this mere open-
ness to opinion change that defines deliberation and not its outcome, be it a consensus or 
even an actual change in preference distribution. Such an outcome, as Michael Fuerstein 
puts it, should rather be considered as an essential byproduct of deliberation, i.e. “a goal 
that can be intentionally achieved only as a consequence of aiming at some other objec-
tive” (2014, p. 282; Elster, 1983). 
 
2.1. Deliberation versus Debate and Bargaining: Deliberative Stance and Social 
Learning 
As Owen and Smith (2013, p. 228) put it, deliberation is not just any talk; it is “only that 
talk that emerges from a deliberative stance amongst participants”. Therefore, I treat de-
liberation as a particular, pure/ideal-type of debate, similar to the “type I deliberation” 
introduced by André Bächtiger et al. (Bächtiger, Niemeyer, Neblo, Steenbergen, & Stei-
ner, 2010), which is clearly distinguished from other pure/ideal-types of debates, such as:  
(1) bargaining—a discussion based on a mutual exchange of concessions, where ben-
efit-seeking participants (oriented towards self-interest) change their mind only 
when gaining something in return; 
(2) debate—a discussion that is based on positional politics, where participants (de-
baters) are oriented towards convincing audiences (non-debating spectators) ra-
ther than each other, and arguments are meant not to convince interlocutors, but 
to ‘defeat’ them. 
Debates are often equated with deliberation. Here, however, I distinguish these terms to 
label different concepts. Claudia Landwehr and Katharina Holzinger (2010, p. 378) iden-
tify the etymological origins of the term by explaining that “the French origin, ‘débattre’, 
meaning ‘to defeat, to strike down’, (figuratively) points to the goal of participants in a 
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debate. Groups are pre-defined, and they present rather than exchange arguments”. Debat-
ers are usually characterized by an “uncompromising mindset” (Gutmann & Thompson, 
2012, p. 65) that drives their positional politics.1 
Bargaining (or hard bargaining) should be distinguished from negotiation. The latter one, 
according to Mark Warren and Jane Mansbridge (2013) can take a form of a “deliberative 
negotiation”. It is a negotiation that includes self-interests, but respects the deliberative ide-
als of mutual respect, equality, reciprocity, mutual justification, fairness, and non-coercion. 
Unlike the usual bargaining that employs the strategic control of information, deliberative 
negotiation treats information on the actual self-interest of parties as a required input to be 
considered with solidarity, not as a hidden agenda to be won at someone else’s expense.2  
This analytical stand3 will allow me to position deliberation within a wider and long-du-
ration systemic context, i.e. in relation not only to other areas and forms of the public 
discourse, but also to the dynamics of changing political processes. Here, I should also 
note that the atrophy of deliberative stance that I wish to investigate here is a concept wider 
than just positional politics (or an uncompromising mindset), because the latter one means 
an absolute persistence, one that is immune even to bargain.4 The atrophy of deliberative 
stance is persistence that is immune to reasons or arguments motivated by general interest, 
                                                          
1 In Landwehr and Holzinger’s (2010) typology, deliberation is an “essentially decision-related interaction”. De-
liberation, as it is understood here, corresponds more to their ‘discussion’. 
2 I agree with Mansbridge et al. (2010) when they say that self-interest plays a legitimate role in public deliber-
ation and “deliberative negotiations” should be considered beneficial in a wider, systemic context. After all, they 
result in preference change. However, my goal here is to treat deliberation as a certain pure type of discussion, 
one that is distinguished form debate and bargaining. This is because even though self-interest does not neces-
sarily have to dominate one’s motives (Mansbridge, 1990), the context and the mode in which it is employed in 
a debate (its institutional arrangement) determines how the preference discrepancy will be dealt with. For in-
stance, bargaining introduces self-interest in a very different way than deliberation or deliberative negotiation 
does. In the latter one, needs should be honestly declared so that they can be included in the common interest. 
Bargaining, on the other hand, might require concealing true interest so that a strategic advantage can be gained. 
3 These three types of discourse can be located on the two-dimensional typology proposed by Chambers, where 
she juxtaposes the Socratic and democratic perspectives of reason. Deliberation refers to “robust reasoning and 
general appeal”, where justification can be shared by general public (public Socratic reason) and motivation is 
the public interest (public democratic reason). Negotiation (preferably taking place behind closed doors) is a 
“well-reasoned debate [public Socratic reason] that takes private reason as its starting point” (private democratic 
reason). Debates, mainly conducted in public, fail the Socratic criterion by employing ‘shallow‘ or “plebiscitory” 
reasoning. It can have either a narrow or a general appeal. In the latter case, “the public nature of the debate 
[public democratic reason] forces speakers to make general appeals, but there is little or no critical accountability 
to ensure that those appeals are well reasoned [plebiscitory Socratic reason]” (Chambers, 2004, p. 398). 
4 Perhaps one of the finest eulogies for the deliberative stance and bargain was made by Edmund Burke in his 
famous Speech to the Electors of Bristol of 1780, in the fragment “on the responsibilities of a Member of Parlia-
ment”. He spoke against the “coercive authority of [electors’] instructions”, i.e. against “determination that pre-
cedes discussion”. As he said, “Parliament is not a congress of ambassadors from different and hostile interests; 
which interests each must maintain, as an agent and advocate, against other agents and advocates; but parliament 
is a deliberative assembly of one nation, with one interest, that of the whole; where, not local purposes, not local 
prejudices, ought to guide, but the general good, resulting from the general reason of the whole” (Burke, 2011). 
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but preferences here can be changed by mutual concessions of self-interests. Positional 
politics is persistence that is immune to all arguments and mutual concessions between 
private self-interests. 
Openness to preference change that is also open to self-interests of others, albeit in a non-
egocentric way, invokes John Dewey’s idea of classroom discussion as face-to-face talk, 
in which participants are focused on “responding to the substance of individual utter-
ances”, and where the teacher is merely a moderator (Kosnoski, 2005). In a wider, sys-
temic context, it modifies the role of democratic leadership, turning it into political 
pedagogy that seeks “a strategy for slowly but dramatically reworking social structures 
and collective identities” (Mariotti, 2014). It goes along Ralph Waldo Emerson’s concept 
of liberal democracy, which allows for the continued revision and refinement of liberal 
political values (von Rautenfeld, 2004). In this instance, deliberation is to be considered 
as a unique process of political learning (or social learning), a type of process involving  
[…] not the simple imposition of an abstract, preconceived standard of rationality but, rather, 
a commitment to politics as an open-ended and continuous learning process in which the 
roles of ‘teacher’ and ‘curriculum’ are raised, and where the matter of what is to be learnt 
has to be settled in the process of learning itself. (Held, 2006, p. 168) 
 
2.2. Deliberation as Consultation on the ‘Ladder of Citizen Participation’ 
A common element of strictly deliberative methods in recent practices, the so-called min-
ipublics, is their evidently consultative status in relation to political power. They are de-
signed as merely advisory bodies for those who make decisions. The results of such 
deliberation are not binding in terms of the final decision. According to the influential 
concept of A Ladder of Citizen Participation by Sherry Arnstein (1969), deliberative tech-
niques identified in such a way should be perceived as a merely symbolic form of partici-
pation, i.e. “tokenism” (see: Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Eight Rungs on the Ladder of Citizen Participation. Based on A Ladder of Citizen 
Participation by Sherry Arnstein (1969) 
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Perceiving deliberation as merely token participation is a result of a quasi-quantitative 
approach to the issue; the position on the ladder of participation depends on the “amount 
of power” that the method provides citizens with. From this perspective, the only reason-
able participation method is co-decision. This, of course, was the explicit intent and a 
conscious theoretical choice of Arnstein (1969, p. 216) when she declared that “participa-
tion is a categorical term for power”. Thus, the ladder describes only the extent of citizens’ 
access to power over themselves in the struggle with official authorities. 
In 2006, Kevin Collins and Ray Ison (2006, p. 2) pointed out that “despite the plethora of 
tools and methods available, [...] Arnstein’s ladder of citizen engagement remains, implicitly 
and explicitly, at the core of many approaches to participation despite being published some 
40 years ago”. Conceptualized in such a way, of course, the framing stimulates citizens’ 
empowerment. However, it also has consequences for how participation is practiced. It limits 
the practitioners’ awareness of involvement, i.e. the expected conditions, results, and pro-
cesses. Without a proper epistemological inquiry into this issue, “practitioners and research-
ers run the risk of using tools, practices and techniques inappropriately, with undesirable 
consequences for policy development and policy outcomes” (Collins & Ison, 2006, p. 4). 
There are various critiques of Arnstein’s ladder (Tritter & McCallum, 2005). In this con-
text, Collins and Ison (2006, p. 5) conclude: 
[...] we suggest that Arnstein’s ladder, with its focus on power, is insufficient for making 
sense of participation at a conceptual or practice level. We suggest that our understandings 
of participation need a new footing and it is perhaps time to jump off Arnstein’s ladder. 
What the authors recommend is an alternative policy paradigm of social learning. Within 
this paradigm, participation is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition to progress towards 
“concerted action among multiple stakeholders” (Collins & Ison, 2006, p. 12). From the 
perspective of deliberative theory, what Arnstein’s ‘amount of power’ perspective ignores 
is the important advantages of consultative deliberation, i.e. a whole range of epistemic 
issues. It does not take into account the qualitative aspect of participation, particularly the 
freedom of discussion and preference change that is not bargaining-based.  
 
3. Factors Affecting the Atrophy of Deliberative Stance 
The atrophy of deliberative stance is a situation in which the participants in a given dis-
cussion become unwilling to change their minds regardless of provided arguments and 
reasons; they maintain their opinion rather than admit that the opposite one is better (po-
sitional politics), or they are willing to change their stance only if the others offer them 
something in return (the possibility of bargain). 
The prospect of opinion change constitutes ‘constructive politics’, which is one of the five 
coding categories of the Discourse Quality Index (DQI). In 2003, when the Index was first 
applied to the proceedings of the House of Commons in the UK, it turned out, not surpris-
ingly, that the parliamentary debate—in spite of its high discourse quality—failed miserably 
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when it comes to constructive politics. MPs were entirely unwilling to change their minds; 
all of their speeches represented positional politics (Steenbergen et al., 2003). The same re-
sult was confirmed for the German Bundestag, even when the party discipline was suspended 
(Landwehr & Holzinger, 2010). This problem is not new and it did not go unnoticed by Carl 
Schmitt (1988) in the turbulent times of the interwar period; it was a proof of the degenera-
tion of the European parliamentary democracies.  
In the case of the mentioned DQI in the UK in 2003, researchers speculated that this had 
been due to the competitive nature of the British political system (Steenbergen et al., 
2003). I believe that the reasons for this are much more profound and universal, namely 
that this competitiveness is a result of certain structural arrangements. When certain pro-
cedural conditions are not met, what one observes is the atrophy of deliberative stance. 
This appears to be particularly problematic when the result of the deliberation is supposed 
to be binding for a given policy issue. 
 
3.1. Decisional Atrophy of Deliberative Stance 
Decisional character is the impact of a given forum on the shape of a policy discussed. It is 
something much stronger than the ‘coordinateness’, described by Landwehr and Holzinger 
(2010), because a discussion can be ‘coordinated’, i.e. being arranged to produce a collec-
tive outcome, but still can have no impact on the final political decision. The very awareness 
of such a decisional nature of a given discussion among its participants is a factor in chang-
ing the terms of a discussion. It generates a combination of socio-psychological phenomena 
within the deliberative body and outside of it. From the deliberative perspective, however, 
it is not certain whether this influence is strictly a positive one. Presumably, decisional 
character generates greater interest and participation. The awareness of the gravity of the 
discussion provokes more responsible participation; it encourages an increased focus and 
actual engagement. However, a more serious approach to the problem also entails a more 
rigorous appraisal of one’s values or interests (irrespective of whether they are a matter of 
private self-interests or religious beliefs). Ian Shapiro (1999) points out that, in some cases, 
deliberation can only induce conflict by bringing “differences to the surface” and “widening 
the political divisions rather than narrowing them”. This in itself can be a positive thing 
from the deliberative systems perspective, yet it still might not be conducive to a high-
quality micro-deliberation. In many cases, the mere prospect of a binding decision can pro-
voke polarization and thus undermine the conditions for genuine deliberation. I shall call 
this hypothetical phenomenon the decisional atrophy of deliberative stance.  
The above-mentioned hypothesis is based on the remarks from John Dryzek (2005, p. 237) 
on one of the key mistakes of the “discursive engagement in a semidetached public 
sphere”. It is not only about the lack of autonomy in the public sphere, or the complete 
non-responsiveness of the authorities, but also about the “too tight a connection between 
[the] public sphere and sovereign authority”. In Dryzek’s view (2002, pp. 87–107), the 
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latter problem lies primarily in the systemic co-optation of public-sphere actors to the cen-
ters of power (the state). Stakeholders involved in the decision-making process are no 
longer willing to sincerely express their opinions in the public space. Dryzek notes that 
such “groups’ entry into the state” (center of political power) tends to leave a “depleted 
civil society” behind. This is why, paradoxically, a “more democratic state” can mean a 
“less democratic polity” (Dryzek, 2002, p. 111). However, this is a manifestation of the 
phenomenon at the macro level. At the micro level—in a discussion—participation in 
power might also impair the deliberative stance by damaging the mechanism of selecting 
an opinion, i.e. of sieving those opinions that are not sufficiently substantiated. Here, I 
focus on the error of “making deliberation decisional” at the micro level specifically. 
In my view, the primary mechanism of the decisional atrophy of deliberative stance would 
be as follows. When stakeholders realize that the result of deliberation can have profound 
consequences for their vested interests, they take action to protect these interests by means 
of political marketing, lobbying, etc., all of which is addressed towards actual or potential 
participants of such a deliberation, thus leading to preexisting opinion petrification (Kahan, 
Peters, Dawson, & Slovic, 2013). When strong ideologies or ethical standpoints come into 
play, preferences are entrenched and the use of deliberation turns out to be counter-effective 
in terms of yielding preference change (Abelson et al., 2003). Such ineffectiveness of de-
liberation has been observed in the case of conflicts of self-interests, e.g. in health care 
rationing (Shapiro, 2003, pp. 36–37). In such cases, deliberative bodies turn into arenas of 
struggle for sovereign power. Learned discussion is replaced with a debate with voting 
and/or bargaining of self-interests. 
On the micro level, the decisional atrophy of deliberation occurs when the mere expecta-
tion of a binding decision causes a change in the external and internal conditions of delib-
eration, which results in the decay of a deliberative stance among the participants of 
deliberation. It leads to a situation where deliberating parties are either indoctrinated, re-
minded, or made aware of their vested interests and ideological standpoints. It changes 
their role in the process and modifies the conditions for preference change, making such a 
change harder to acquire through argumentation. In the context of the specific nature of 
this role, the necessity to resolve the controversy (when opinions are rigid) leads to typical 
forms of decision-making, i.e. arbitrary individual decisions, voting, bargain, or expertise. 
The idea of a deliberative preference change through learned discussion might not be 
structurally compatible with such aggregative forms of civic participation (a social dia-
logue involving the representation of a particular interest group or a particular vision of 
the common good). It might be the very structure of these forms (primarily the nature of 
participation as representation) that provokes the petrification of opinions.  
 
3.2. Consultation and Co-Decision: An Alternative to the Ladder of Participation 
As a theoretical description of this issue, and in reference to Arnstein’s ‘ladder’, I propose 
the following, provisional qualitative distinction between two ideal types of citizens’ par-
ticipation: traditional co-deciding and deliberative consultation (Zabdyr-Jamróz, 2011). 
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Typically, when it comes to participatory methods other than just voting, citizens’ co-
decision mechanisms mostly involve some kind of a corporate representation of stake-
holders (parties, interest groups, selected communities, ideological positions, etc.) or, at 
the very least, the presence of elites with particular competence (expertise, experience, or 
special involvement in the issue). These participants are opinionated mostly by default, 
i.e. through the relation of representation. In contrast, deliberative consultation involves 
ordinary, lay citizens merely presenting themselves (as a ‘representative sample’). They 
participate in a debate with their own mind and if, by any chance, they are convinced by 
the power of arguments, they can change their opinion, since they are not bound by a 
special relation to anyone.  
Differences between these two models are presented more elaborately by means of the 
table and description below. This analytical distinction shows that there are certain struc-
tural hindrances to deliberation and that the actual roles performed in participation shape 
its character and the outcome. It is significant to note that the differences between co-
decision and consultation are not limited to formally granted competences. Some de iure 
‘consultative’ or ‘advisory’ bodies can, in practice, function as co-decision bodies, espe-
cially when the participants’ authority cannot be ignored by decision-makers. It is mainly 
the structure of a given discussion, i.e. its subject and character of participation (represen-
tation), that determine the role of participation. The following distinction does not imply 
that deliberative minipublics should not and cannot have decisional powers. It is merely 
to indicate certain factors that may lead to the atrophy of the deliberative stance.  
 
Table 1. Traditional Co-Decision versus Deliberative Consultation 
 
TRADITIONAL 
CO-DECISION 
DELIBERATIVE CON⁠SULTA-
TION 
 
“CONSULTATIONS”  
WITH STAKEHOLDERS 
TYPICAL 
MINIPUBLICS 
Participant: 
“corporations”, parties, factions 
Individual citizens 
Representatives 
(of stakeholders / parties) 
Initially (by default): 
Strongly interested,  
familiarized, 
established opinion 
Not interested, not informed, no 
established opinions 
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Function: 
Expression of developed  
preferences 
Development of preferences 
Aggregation of preferences 
(ideologies, interests) 
and/or providing expertise 
Social learning 
Participation  
paradigm: 
REPRESENTATION 
of particular interests 
or particular visions of  
the common good 
PRESENTATION 
of citizens’ judgments 
(participants ‘represent  
themselves’) 
Discourse type: 
BARGAINING 
(reciprocal concessions) 
or DEBATES 
(to ‘win’ in the view of 
deci⁠sion-makers, voters, etc.) 
DELIBERATION 
(discussion with prospects of  
deliberative preference change) 
Goal: DECISION-MAKING LEARNED OPINION 
Result: Decision (obligatory) Preference change (expected) 
Approach: 
Factional–collective Holistic–individual 
Particular self-interests or com-
peting visions of  
common interest 
Public justification,  
common interests  
or legitimate self-interests 
Prerequisites: 
Issue networks Demos 
Background institutions—per-
manent partners of  
authorities 
No background— 
random sample 
 
Deliberative citizens’ consultation and traditional co-decision have different subjects. 
Non-decisional deliberation involves more general political topics, ones that are not par-
ticularly controversial for establishing the overall principles of a given policy. Consulta-
tions are often practiced at the policy level so that the preferences of the local community 
in terms of the allocation of resources can be investigated. They are mostly used as a way 
Preventing the Atrophy of the Deliberative Stance 
 
101 
to improve the responsiveness of governance. Issues that are political and highly contro-
versial, i.e. marked by strong ideological involvement as well as those concerning partic-
ular self-interests, are not compatible with deliberation. What is crucial here is that often 
the subject of discussion (whether it is controversial or not) determines the actual character 
of the participation and the role of participants (‘do I feel like a representative of a given 
doctrine?’), thus shaping their attitudes and behaviors. 
 
3.3. The Role of Participants 
What coincides with traditional co-decision is the elite status of participants and the repre-
sentative character of their role. Quite often (though not always), the actual decision-making 
bodies are composed of experts, stakeholders’ representatives (opinion leaders), and govern-
ment officials. Frequently (even within ‘consultations’), certain opinions (particularly those 
held by experts and stakeholders’ representatives) become, in fact, binding because of their 
high authoritativeness. Due to either the expertise or the fact that the opinion is given on 
behalf of an important stakeholder, the decision-maker is compelled to treat such advice as 
binding. In effect, the merely ‘advisory’ body has, in fact, a decisional character.  
Such a character of the role performed in the discussion is the reason why it is somewhat 
difficult to change the opinion of its participants. Vested interests and ideological engage-
ment—often supported by experts’ opinions—are both typical characteristics of co-decid-
ing civil society actors, namely labor unions, lobby groups, political associations, think-
tanks, etc. These participants are mostly part of the ‘issue network’, i.e. wide range policy-
development partners of the government that are constantly ‘on standby’ (always inter-
ested in the issue, always opinionated, and ready to engage and present their case). They 
have certain preconceived convictions and fixed points of agenda, usually ones based on 
vested interests and ingrained ideologies that, by default, are difficult to change. 
Interestingly, even convictions built on the basis of expert knowledge and practical expe-
rience in a given subject have a tendency to stiffen and be resistant to empirical evidence 
that contradicts them. As Philip E. Tetlock (2005, p. 191) concludes, “Experimental psy-
chologists have found that many judgmental shortcomings can be traced to a deeply in-
grained feature of human nature: our tendency to apply more stringent standards to 
evidence that challenges our prejudices than to evidence that reinforces those prejudices”. 
In fact, as Dan Kahan’s (2013) research shows, those who are more competent also tend 
to be more opinionated in political issues, and use their better skills to defend their con-
victions in spite of the challenging evidence, sometimes even obscuring the facts. This 
conclusion has been confirmed by Jane Suiter et al. in the context of the application of 
deliberative methods. As the authors state:  
Those who may be of higher social standing—that is, those who are older and are more 
knowledgeable—tend to change their minds less than those with lower levels of knowledge 
or who are younger. This is particularly the case for more salient issues. (Suiter, Farrell, & 
O’Malley, 2014) 
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Thus, when it comes to the deliberative stance, a crucial structural divergence between 
deliberative consultation and traditional co-decision should be emphasized, namely that 
the nature of the participation determines the chance of changing opinions through discus-
sion. In co-decision (bargaining, voting preceded by debates, or even expert-advising de-
cision-makers), just as in typical forms of aggregative democracy, the participants of 
discussion are representatives of a variety of bodies (political parties/the electorate, their 
interest groups (stakeholders), or even their field of expertise) (Wagner, 2014). These par-
ticipants are, by definition, limited to their mandate, be it explicitly or implicitly. A free 
mandate (one that allows for a change of opinion) involves either the free hand in estab-
lishing a political program (as the realization of the will of the electorate) or the possibility 
of making mutual concessions within bargaining, thus leading to a compromise. This 
means that a change of heart on the participants’ part (due to reasonable argumentation, 
which is the desired effect of deliberation) would be a betrayal of their mandate. If they 
make some concessions, backing down from their position, it is only as a result of acquir-
ing reciprocal benefits from the other party. Similarly, when one modifies an ideologically 
motivated position (within a political, religious, or ethical doctrine), at the very least they 
are obliged to insist upon certain fundamental assumptions. Such people are perceived, 
and perceive themselves, as representatives of a given system of ideas. 
The participants of consultative deliberation, however, do not represent anyone or any-
thing except for constituting a ‘representative sample’ of the population. They are present-
ing themselves, their views, and their opinions in person (Badiou, 1988, pp. 95–115). In 
principle, they are not bound by any constraints (e.g. instructions from a mandatary). A 
change of their opinions as a result of deliberation is supposed to simulate how the distri-
bution of preferences within a population would change if the entire population were able 
to take part in a form of dialogic learning (Fishkin, 1991, p. 81). That is why strictly advi-
sory deliberative methods focus on lay citizens, i.e. persons who are uninvolved and not 
well-versed in the issue, which comes down to those who do not have undue preconcep-
tions. This is also why, while all citizens have interests (stakes) in public issues, these ‘lay 
citizens’ are distinguished from ‘stakeholders’, i.e. those who are part of the issue network 
(Kahane, Loptson, Herriman, & Hardy, 2013).5 
                                                          
5 An interesting example of the successful disarmament of the atrophy of deliberative stance in a representative 
body is the German Conference Committee (Vermittlungsausschuss), i.e. a forum, whose objective is to reconcile 
legislative conflicts between the two parliamentary houses. It is characterized by a high level of constructive 
politics; however, this is evidently due to certain extraordinary arrangements. Firstly, in this forum, a consensus 
or a compromise is required and presets the outcome of the discussion, which is a criterion of its success. This 
probably even distorts deliberation by enforcing a conciliatory approach or even a bargain; it makes a preference 
change mandatory (unlike in the true deliberative stance). Secondly, “public pressure is relatively low, since 
[Committee’s] discussions are confidential; thus, the participants can act as trustees. Thus, although they are still 
representatives of their constituencies, they are more likely to change their opinion in the light of alternative 
arguments” (Spörndli, 2003). A similar example of the advantageous discursive conditions would be the Consti-
tutional Convention of 1787 in Philadelphia, which deliberated in secret, unlike the French Assemblée Constitu-
ante of 1789 that was held in public (Elster, 1995, p. 251). A good deliberative quality of the former one, as 
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3.4. The Structure of Debate, the Role of the Audience 
Steven Skultety (2009, p. 44) argues that “the very structure of political deliberation is com-
petitive”, at least as “competition among proposals”. However, the degree and quality of 
such a competition are variable in different types of discussion. The type of participation 
determines motives, incentives, and relationships between participants. Strictly deliberative 
forms have the so-called ‘cool’ structure; they are designed is such a way so that partici-
pants do not become rivals (in contrast to ‘hot’ decision-making bodies, where interests and 
ideas compete) as they strive to support a joint search for a solution to a problem (Fung, 
2003). Deliberation should be governed by what has been described by Monique Deveaux 
(2003) as the “revisability” principle, i.e. a rule guaranteeing that if anyone changes their 
mind on an issue, they do not lose the respect of others. In such cases, dissent is considered 
a contribution to the discussion. 
In this respect, an interesting dilemma occurs concerning one of the most appraised repub-
lican concepts, namely “emulation”. John Adams (2011, pp. 232–233) used this term to 
describe a virtue derived from “the passion for distinction”. As he stated:  
Wherever men, women, or children are to be found, whether they be old or young, rich or 
poor, high or low, wise or foolish, ignorant or learned, every individual is seen to be strongly 
actuated by a desire to be seen, heard, talked of, approved and respected by the people about 
him, and within his knowledge. (Adams, 2011, pp. 232–233) 
The opposite negative expression of this passion is ambition, which is a vice of tyrants, 
because it “aims at power as a means of distinction”. It is tyrannical, because it is a desire 
to permanently rise above others, and it tends to destroy all political life. The virtue of 
emulation, on the other hand, desires to merely excel and, in fact, requires the company of 
one’s peers (“to be seen in action”), thus fueling participation and creating demand for the 
public sphere. This virtue of emulation was even presented by Hannah Arendt (1990, 
pp. 120–121, 136, 196–202) as an essential factor for true political emancipation. However, 
from the deliberative point of view (bearing in mind the virtue of open-mindedness), there 
is a darker side to this noble desire, because it creates a fertile ground for the ‘audience 
democracy’, where discursive performance is rewarded by audience appraisal as well as by 
voting decisions reached after the discussion. Unfortunately, neither of these ‘rewards’ is 
deliberation-friendly. They do not reward the actual problem-solving through social learn-
ing, but merely endorse the rhetorical triumph over others, as in so-called Claro! cultures 
that are characterized by a sort of “discursive machismo” (Gambetta, 1998). 
 
                                                          
Gutmann and Thompson (1996, p. 115) point out after Madison, was attributed to the fact that “members could 
speak candidly, change their positions, and accept compromises without constantly worrying about what the 
public and the press might say”. This corresponds to Chambers’ (2004) considerations on the impact of secrecy 
on the Socratic reason in deliberation. 
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From this perspective, debates are always performed with audiences, since the reason why 
the debaters confront one another is to compete for the spectators’ approval (sometimes ex-
pressed via voting). Thus, it takes a form of manipulation, pandering, or image-maintaining 
(Chambers, 2004, p. 393). Bargaining, on the other hand, should never occur in front of 
spectators, because participants would have difficulty in compromising with their integrity 
or honesty being judged from the outside. Deliberation as consultation can be said to be in a 
rather awkward position. It should have an audience (especially the decision-makers), who 
should be influenced by its process and conclusions. At the same time, however, it should 
be performed as if there was no audience (in the eyes of deliberators), so that the participants 
do not compete for any spectators’ approval. 
 
3.5. Summary: Deliberation in Democratic Societies 
All these phenomena correspond to Alexis de Tocqueville’s reflections on the persistence 
of views in a democracy. Contrary to the traditional criticism stating that it is based on the 
whim of masses (Gundersen, 2000, pp. 3–4), this political system provokes a petrification 
of preferences. A kind of relativism discovered in a free public sphere, paradoxically, 
makes the citizens stick to their convictions more fiercely. As the author says: 
Since all social theories, one by one, have been contested and fought, those who are attached 
to one of them keep it, not so much because they are sure that it is good, as because they are 
not sure that there is a better one. (Tocqueville, 2010, p. 229) 
Then he concludes, stating that:  
[…] when [reasonable] opinions are doubted, men end up being attached solely to instincts 
and to material interests, which are much more visible, more tangible and more permanent 
by their nature than opinions are. […] That is a self-evident truth; there is no need to discuss 
it; you are rich and I am poor. (Tocqueville, 2010, p. 230). 
This remark presents the issue in a wider, systemic perspective. The decisional atrophy of 
deliberative stance is an overall petrification of opinions and results from a complex phe-
nomenon that is typical of modern democracies; one that occurs when a given controversial 
issue (either ideologically or by virtue of being relevant to particular interests) is to be de-
cided. In such case, a specific rhetoric is invoked, most commonly in the form of the dis-
course of ‘crisis’ and of the ‘war of the worlds’ (Tannen, 1999). With strong polarization, 
preferences become ‘entrenched’, which makes expectations with regard to a change of 
opinion among the participants of deliberation futile (Druckman et al., 2013). There is also 
a real risk that stakeholders will try to influence the course of deliberation itself by interfer-
ing with its objectivity and impartiality. Bearing this in mind, it is even recommended to 
use deliberative methods rapidly before the stakeholders manage to understand the situation 
and take an action, such as a media campaign (Abelson et al., 2003). Unfortunately, this 
recommendation cannot be implemented in the case of the institutionalization of delibera-
tive procedures. Giving these methods decisional competences and a permanent place in 
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the system also exposes them to constant pressures from various stakeholders; these pres-
sures are aimed at the destruction of deliberative virtues among participants. 
Ceding decision-making powers to deliberative bodies results in the gradual replacement 
of the educational aspect of discussion with antagonism. In such circumstances, the typical 
solution is to abandon the role of deliberative bodies as a place for free discussion and, 
simply, to turn them into a forum for voting and bargaining. This might have been the his-
torical fate of the institutions of parliament all over Europe (Leydet, 2014). Originally, any 
given parliament was more of an advisory body to the monarch and a part of a more com-
plex system of power that required the consent of various elements (de Jouvenel, 1957). In 
some cases, e.g. in 17th-century England, candidates for the Parliament abstained from de-
claring their opinions on a given issue in advance even though it was of great political 
significance (e.g. the religious and dynastic policies of James II right before the Glorious 
Revolution of 1688). Maurice Ashley (1966, p. 245) speculates that they were not willing 
to commit to any line of policy “until they had gathered together and thrashed things out”. 
It is safe to say that in a contemporary parliamentary system such a deliberative attitude 
would be mercilessly punished by the media and/or the electorate. In the 17th century, how-
ever, parliaments might have been the embodiment of the deliberative approach. With time, 
and with the expansion of parliamentary powers and the subsequent rise of organized po-
litical parties, they turned into the arena of ideological clashes and political bargains 
(Zabdyr-Jamróz, 2009; Leydet, 2014). In the end, the fact remains that modern democratic 
representative arrangements do not go well with the deliberative stance.6 Such are the con-
sequences of representation; it tends to spoil the idea of free, authentic, and reasonable 
discussion in favor of a partisan eristic and an uncompromising mindset.  
 
4. Discussion: ‘How to Deal with the Atrophy of Deliberative Stance?’ 
Before I go further into the consequences of these considerations, I should emphasize that 
my intent was not to negate Cohen’s (2007, p. 219) decision-oriented definition of deliber-
ation, nor to ruthlessly shatter Arnstein’s (1969) ‘ladder of participation’. These concepts 
apply to other theoretical and practical purposes. The same is true for the notion of ‘delib-
erative negotiation’ (Warren & Mansbridge, 2013). For the purposes of this paper, I merely 
wanted to try another theoretical approach and explore a different path in order to see 
whether this would lead me to a relevant conclusion. By so doing, I build upon the systemic 
approach to deliberative democracy, but also expand and develop several important details. 
 
  
                                                          
6 Noble though it might have been, the eloquent Speech to the Electors of Bristol did not convince the electors; 
Edmund Burke had to abandon hopes for re-election from Bristol (Heffer, 2011, p. 30). 
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4.1. Developing the Deliberative Systems Approach 
The distinction between consultation and co-decision seems to resemble James Bohman’s 
distinction between minipublics and minidemoi, but, in fact, it explores the issue in a dif-
ferent dimension. The latter typology clearly follows the “amount of power” approach that 
is represented by Arnstein’s ladder of participation. Minipublic is the citizens’ deliberative 
body that lacks decisional authority (e.g. a deliberative poll, citizen’s jury, etc.), merely 
supplementing other democratic institutions. Minidemos, on the other hand, is a body that 
shares the minipublic’s communicative status, but is also equipped with decisional powers 
(Bohman, 2012, pp. 72–93, 84–89). Therefore, minidemoi exist alongside other decision-
making institutions, such as referendums or elected assemblies. On the ladder of partici-
pation, minidemos would be classified in terms of co-decision, whereas minipublic merely 
as consultation or tokenism.  
My intent is to point out that, while being very appealing from the democratic point of 
view, minidemos is, in fact, a particularly fragile and unstable discursive arrangement; it 
is subject to the decisional atrophy of deliberative stance. Over time it will lean towards 
other forms of communication (debating and bargaining), hence losing its deliberative 
stance. In other words, I argue (or, rather, I fear) that in the longer systemic perspective, 
minidemos functioning in a more impactful political capacity (as a deliberative political 
decision-making body) might be an evolutionarily unstable institution. 
Here, I also find John Parkinson’s (2012, p. 169) appreciation of certain forms of repre-
sentation and accountability (especially those based on election and self-appointment) as 
problematic. I do not reject them as illegitimate even for the process of deliberation (in 
fact, in my further research I intend to systematically reconcile deliberation with represen-
tation within deliberative governance approach). Rather, I point out that they do not go 
well with the deliberative stance. In fact they seem to be the main reason for the atrophy 
of deliberative stance even if representation is “based on flexible constituencies rather than 
a fixed, positional relationship between principals and agents” (Parkinson, 2012, p. 169). 
Also, I am not claiming that it is impossible for a representative to change her or his mind; 
I merely point out that it is much harder and often requires non-deliberative means. This 
is why (within the traditional co-decision–deliberative consultation dichotomy), I intro-
duce the distinction between representation and presentation (representativeness through 
random selection), where citizens do not represent but, instead, “present themselves” 
(Badiou, 1988, pp. 95–115). 
 
4.2. Stepping Down Arnstein’s Ladder? 
The conclusion of this theoretical proposal is somewhat unorthodox from the perspective 
of civic engagement movements. In order to promote the paradigm of social learning (con-
certed action through deliberation), instead of “jumping off the ladder of participation”—
as Collins and Ison (2006) metaphorically propose—perhaps it would prove more effective 
to step down onto some of the lower rungs. This notion might be hard to accept, especially 
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in a world where citizens’ empowerment is still glaringly inadequate. However, it should 
be noted that perhaps in order to facilitate social learning and improve the quality of our 
democracies, one should not always aim at the highest rungs of the ladder of participation, 
which is not to say that one should never aim for maximum empowerment. 
One key point of the systemic approach is vital here. Namely, a given deliberative event 
does not have to be decisional in order to be more than just “idle talk”, i.e. to have impact 
within the whole of deliberative system (Chambers, 2012). There are other actors (deci-
sion-makers), who listen and can be persuaded. If they are not subject to the partisan rhet-
oric and are not engaged in such a competition (being an attentive audience instead), they 
might be willing to shift their opinion over time (Mackie, 2006). More than this, over time 
such a preference change can lead to a substantial policy modification. This phenomenon 
is described by the concept of ‘decision by accretion’, which is an essential component 
within the systemic approach by Jane Mansbridge and others (2012, p. 8). It refers to a 
situation in which some decisions “have no clear-cut point at which an observer can say 
that a decision has been taken” and “can be seen as collective decisions”. Being “based on 
widespread collective discussion and interaction”, they are “emergent rather than defi-
nite”. In this vein, the distinction between traditional co-decision and deliberative consul-
tation is merely a logical conclusion of the systemic turn. It affirms and embraces the idea 
that deliberation does not have to (and even should not) be decisional7 in order to have a 
significant policy impact.  
However, this is just one of the conclusions of this proposal. Now that it is clear what 
hinders deliberation when it is made decisional, perhaps it is possible to examine some of 
these factors more closely by isolating them and negating their impact. By doing so, one 
might just be able to combine a sufficient “amount” of power with a sufficient dose of 
deliberative social learning. 
 
4.3. Rhetorics 
What differentiates deliberative approaches is, in fact, the evaluation of rhetorics. More 
traditional deliberative democrats consider it a threat to the democratic process. As repre-
sentatives of the “traditional political theory from Plato to Habermas”, these thinkers equate 
rhetorics with emotive manipulation, propaganda, and demagoguery. Hence, what they 
want is to purge rhetorics from deliberation (Dryzek, 2002). Other theoreticians, however, 
point out that rhetorics should not be expelled from the debate due to freedom of expression, 
and that manipulation is very close to persuasion. Forms of communication that are similar 
                                                          
7 That being said, there is an inherent problem with following this diagnosis. I would call it a ‘decisional paradox 
of deliberation’. On the one hand, in order to perform its role, i.e. induce social learning, it might be preferable 
for deliberation not to be decisional. On the other hand, the emphasis on the non-decisional character is a serious 
threat to the representativeness of such deliberation. Research has shown that citizens’ will to participate in time-
consuming and costly deliberation weakens significantly when they do not feel that their involvement will be of 
significance to the final decision (Abelson et al., 2003). 
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to rhetorics, such as ‘greeting’ or ‘storytelling’, can make others feel welcome with their 
input in conversation, or draw attention to certain issues, making others aware of its 
im⁠portance and thus empowering previously marginalized categories of people (Young, 
1996, pp. 130–131; 2000, pp. 23–27). Most notably, some forms of rhetorics—especially 
“bridg⁠ing” gestures, but even irony (Basu, 1999; Lombardini, 2013), invective (Shiffman, 
2002) or shaming (Tarnopolsky, 2007)—often serve an important deliberative goal of in-
ducing a preference change (Dryzek, 2010b). Simone Chambers (2009) even goes as far as 
to distinguish “good”, deliberative rhetorics from the “bad”, plebiscitary kind. All this sup-
ports the rehabilitation of the persuasive aspect of rhetorics. 
However, the problem of the detrimental systemic consequences of (plebiscitary) rhetorics 
for modern democracies remains. As James Fishkin (2011, p. 6) points out, “As our politi-
cal process is colonized by the persuasion industry, as our public dialogue is voiced increas-
ingly in advertising, our system has undertaken a long journey from Madison to Madison 
Avenue”. As Chambers (2009, p. 33) puts it, “Plebiscitary rhetoric deploys speech strate-
gically for the purposes of winning”. It turns debate into arguing, i.e. an ordeal of words in 
an environment of the audience democracy and positional politics, with a minimal chance 
of preference change. Such rhetorics is a tool used most efficiently by the powerful in order 
to manipulate people and effectively disenfranchise them. This, as John Bohman (2012) 
points out, is one of the main challenges for the deliberative systems approach.  
The classical deliberative democracy is generally sceptical towards rhetorics. While grant-
ing it raison d’être within the wider public and political sphere (Dryzek, 2002, pp. 165–
167), the deliberative theory generated a kind of ‘defensive’ or ‘entrenching’ (as opposed 
to expansive/systemic) approach that focuses on micro-deliberation. The intent is to create 
a sort of ‘deliberative adytum’ with the purpose of finding a preservation area for learned 
discussion within the public discourse. Such a discussion would be insulated “from certain 
negative or distorting effects of the broader public sphere” (Chambers, 2004, p. 400)—
shielded from detrimental “public pressures” (Pettit, 2013, p. 232), not contaminated by 
the fallout of rhetorics; the strategy of “mutually assured distraction” (“MAD”)8 (Fishkin, 
2011, pp. 4–5), an ideological “war of the worlds” (Tannen, 1999), and, eventually, deep 
ideological polarization (Klein, 2014). 
This approach is not caused by some special disgust towards rhetorics in itself. In fact, 
persuasion has an important place in deliberation as a trigger for opinion change and rec-
iprocity. However, one should also be aware of the fact that the hypertrophy of rhetorics 
(even of ‘storytelling’ when it is treated dishonestly) eventually leads to affective polari-
zation (Webster & Abramowitz, 2017), petrification of opinions, and—by definition—
negates deliberation, taking away its place in the public sphere. Therefore, the goal here 
is to protect this particularly fragile mode of communication (Owen & Smith, 2013). 
                                                          
8 ‘Distraction’ is replacing ‘destruction’ from the original MAD doctrine of the Cold War. 
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All this leads to the micro-deliberative strategy, namely proposing the minipublic as such 
a deliberative adytum. Here, the deliberation can be shielded from the external distortions. 
In its most assertive form, the micro-deliberative strategy proposes that the minipublics 
should be made decisional, i.e. turned into minidemoi, in order to improve the entirety of 
the deliberative system. However, Cristina Lafont criticizes this stance by pointing to its 
strong elitist vibe: lay-citizens via deliberative process become experts of all sorts9. In her 
view, such a strategy “suggests that the only choices we have are between non-participa-
tory deliberation and non-deliberative participation” (Lafont, 2015, p. 48). Thus, it “fore-
close[s] large-scale quality deliberation” by presenting a de facto elite deliberation model, 
i.e. the deliberation of a selected minority of citizens, as the most viable option. 
 
4.4. The Open Siege of Alesia  
For the purposes of this paper I am suggesting that there is a systemic problem with a 
power-oriented micro-deliberative strategy. When a deliberative minipublic becomes de-
cisional, it also becomes a target for pressures from stakeholders. Hence, as John Dryzek 
(2005) notes, deliberation should be kept at a certain distance from political power. Fol-
lowing Jürgen Habermas’ stance (1996, pp. 486–487) that communicative power is exer-
cised in the manner of a “self-limiting siege” of the state, I would like to further elaborate 
on this metaphor. Keeping deliberation in the public sphere, i.e. besieging the center of 
political decision-making, should not only hold back its pressure on the state (in order not 
to deplete the civil society, as Dryzek would put it), but also fortify itself from pressures 
from the outside (stakeholders, the for-profit sector, organized ideology proponents, etc.) 
Deliberation should be protected not only from the state, but also from other actors/spheres 
of civil society and public debate, mainly interest groups and the sectarian discourse. From 
the systemic perspective, what is important here is to preserve deliberative fora in order to 
allow vital exchange of information to occur at least in one part of the system so that it 
can influence its other, decisional elements. 
Habermas’ “siege” metaphor suggests a strategy known from the Gallic Wars of Julius 
Caesar as the Siege of Alesia. Caesar’s tactics in this battle was to besiege the Gallic 
stronghold of Alesia. Not having enough soldiers, he could not just assault the city, so he 
fortified his positions against any attempts at breaking the blockade from the inside (cf. 
Habermas’ “self-limiting siege”). Soon, however, a new threat became apparent; Gallic 
reinforcements were coming (stakeholders interference). At that point Caesar decided to 
fortify his positions also on the outside in order to defend the siege from an external attack. 
The very same tactics could be considered a guide for ensuring the proper place of delib-
eration in any democratic polity. It should exert pressure on (and fortify against) a center 
of power, while at the same time fortifying one’s position against any external influences 
that would threaten the integrity of deliberation. The very same recommendations are 
                                                          
9 I should note that, in my view, the validity of this interpretation is questionable. 
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long-standing principles that guide e.g. the proceedings of trial juries in common law sys-
tems. This metaphor should not go so far as to suggest that deliberation should be com-
pletely insulated from the outside inputs, i.e. from arguments and reason (as information 
on relevant self-interests, emotions, and expertise). Rather, the idea is to protect it form 
factors that lead to the atrophy of the deliberative stance.  
This, of course, is still a micro-deliberative strategy, but one that does not strive after direct 
power. It is defensive for the small-scale quality deliberations. However, while micro-de-
liberation should have its secured post in the siege of the state, it cannot monopolize access 
to it the way that the Siege of Alesia metaphor suggests. By blocking access of other inputs 
(most notably public debate and stakeholders’ bargaining), deliberation would effectively 
expose itself to the decisional atrophy of deliberation. Hence, the deliberative siege should 
be open, allowing other discourses to besiege the state as well. In this proposition the final 
decision should be the interplay of those discourse types, competing against each other and 
complementing one another in the course of policy-making processes. 
The Open Siege of Alesia Model of positioning deliberation fulfils both the defensive and 
the expansive roles for deliberative ideals, promoting a large-scale deliberative participa-
tion. If it is true that discourse types can spread also by means of popularity, then deliber-
ation should have a bastion, i.e. a foothold in the discursive system that would provide an 
example of the deliberative stance, showing the way to inspire and spread just as much in 
everyday life as in key formal institutions. In other words, the Open Alesia Model uses 
the micro-deliberative strategy as a means to improve the quality of large-scale delibera-
tion. It is consistent with the remarks by Michael MacKenzie and Mark Warren (2012), 
who stated that deliberative bodies could show “the right way” to the rest of the system, 
creating good habits and spreading good will and trust among citizens. However, having 
in mind Parkinson’s (2012, p. 168) remark that “trust in institutions generally is in marked 
decline”, one has to admit that the above-mentioned model relies on “blind faith” towards 
elitist deliberative bodies as decision-makers. The point here is for micro-deliberation to 
have a formal—not material—impact on the public sphere. It is not supposed to deliver 
decisions by dictating the supposed contents of learned public opinion, thus replacing pub-
lic debate. Micro-deliberation should, however, inspire public debate by changing the way 
it is conducted, i.e. by raising public expectations, informing the public, promoting public 
learning, and proliferating quality deliberation in the public sphere. In other words, as 
Lafont (2015, p. 60) puts it, “Deliberative democrats should endorse the use of minipublics 
for shaping public opinion, not public policies”. 
In this instance, the Open Alesia Model does not rely on the micro-deliberative strategy ex-
clusively, but it also calls for support at the macro level. It demands—again following Lafont 
(2015, p. 59)—the actual improvement of “the deliberative quality of the political discourse 
in the broad public sphere”, a support that “may require structural changes such as improving 
the diversity of mass media and their independence from market pressures, strengthening the 
independence of political parties from concentrated wealth, political campaign reform, and 
so on”. This will be the way to enhance citizens to a better-quality discourse. 
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Here I can only outline the Open Siege of Alesia Model as a metaphor of positioning micro-
deliberation in the deliberative system. This notion will require further elaboration and tack-
ling its various inherent challenges. One of the most apparent would be the aforementioned 
impact of publicity on the discourse quality. In order for the Open Alesia Model to work—
for the quality deliberation to spread across the system—the deliberative mini-publics re-
quire an attentive audience that actually seeks political freedom in a profound way. However, 
the very same attention that allows people to learn from a good discursive example might, 
in the end, provoke the participants of deliberation to compete for attention and approval. 
 
5. Conclusions 
Donald Bello Hutt has associated deliberative democratic theory with political freedom 
via republican theory. His considerations led him to the principle of Equality of Access 
and Deliberation, i.e.  
[…] the endorsement of […] an egalitarian principle including all those potentially affected by 
collective decisions, securing the capacity of those individuals to form and transform their pref-
erences in an autonomous fashion, and providing them with the opportunity to participate in the 
deliberative process through which collective decisions shall be adopted. (Hutt, 2018, p. 104) 
I argue that in order to secure this “capacity to form and transform preferences in an au-
tonomous fashion”, i.e. to exercise political freedom meaningfully in the light of Hannah 
Arendt’s understanding of revolution, a formal access to power might not be required and, 
in fact, can be detrimental.  
Participation in government cannot be a mere cooptation that often takes form of the tech-
nology of manufacturing legitimation (Harrison & Mort, 1998; Wallington, Lawrence, & 
Loechel, 2008). Political freedom requires an ability to exercise power meaningfully, i.e. 
to comprehend the complexity of the world and to see through the pre-established ideolo-
gies, the plebiscitary rhetorics of partisans, and the white noise of mediatized politics. It 
requires prerequisites to release itself form the Procrustes bed of status quo and see polit-
ical alternatives beyond what is seemingly obvious, i.e. beyond entrenched political doc-
trines, immediate emotional impulses, and fixed self-interests. In other words, it requires 
an imaginative capacity for deliberative change, which will make it possible to see and to 
better understand policy determinants and truly available options.  
The deliberative stance is a fragile attitude; there are various factors that cause its atrophy. 
By adopting the systemic approach, I pinpoint some institutional factors that generate this 
atrophy of deliberation. I find out that participants of discussion become more opinionated 
when they: are representatives; are in the presence of an audience; or have the prospect of 
a binding decision. The last one, i.e. the decisional atrophy of deliberative stance, corre-
lates with the former two. The purpose of this paper was to show these structural hin-
drances to deliberation; that the actual roles performed in participation shape its character 
and outcomes. These circumstances, I argue, hinder not only the quality of public discus-
sion, but also the real political freedom of citizens by limiting their scope of political and 
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policy options. Therefore, I add more arguments to Lafont’s (2015) critique of a micro-
deliberative strategy that promotes decisional minipublics or minidemoi, as Bohman 
(2012) would call them. I demonstrate how problematic deliberative decision-making can 
be, as the finest example of Dryzek’s (2002, p. 111) paradox when a “more democratic 
state” results in a “less democratic polity” shows. All this leads me to the conclusion—
and a notion that should at least be entertained—that on some occasions it is better that, in 
order to preserve their deliberative character in the systemic context, deliberative mini-
publics do not have decision-making powers. To preserve the deliberative stance from its 
atrophy, I have also proposed the Open Siege of Alesia Model for positioning deliberation 
in a wider deliberative system.  
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